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CHAPTER 1
SHELL GAMES: THE CONTINUING LEGACY
OF RIGHTS TO MINERALS AND WATER
ON SPANISH AND MEXICAN LAND GRANTS
IN THE SOUTHWEST

G. Emlen Hall
University of New Mexico Law School
Albuquerque, New Mexico
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§ 1.01

Introduction

Title to large parts of the land base of the American Southwest, from Colorado on the north to Arizona on the south and
from California on the west to Texas on the east, originates
in the law of the United States' antecedent sovereigns. In
California, approximately 8,850,000 acres of land stem from
recognized Mexican land grants prior to the 1848 Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo which transferred sovereignty over the
territory to the United States. 1 In New Mexico, Colorado, and
Arizona, the United States confirmed the validity of title to
12,170,002 land grant acres.2 In Texas, title to 26,280,000 acres
owe their inception to Spanish or Mexican land grants.3
By any measure, these acres are critical to the land base of
the states that now contain them. Fifteen percent of New
Mexico and Texas were privatized before either became a part
of the United States.4 In the other areas that once belonged
to Mexico, the percentages range downward from there.• However, beyond their areal extent, the private grants are perhaps
more important for the critical resources that their ancient
locations command. Spanish and Mexicans sited their land
grants for the grass, timber, minerals, and water that the sites
offered. Naturally, the oldest grants commandeered the best
that the natural world, as it was then understood, would yield.•
1 S. Dana & M. Krueger, California Lands 37 -38 (1958); Treaty of Peace, Friend.ship,
Limits and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico, Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922, 929-38
(1848) (hereafter Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo).
2 V. Westphall, Mercedes Reales, Hispanic Land Grant& of the Upper Rio Grande
Region 286-88 (1983) (hereafter Mercedes Reales).
3T. Miller, TM Public Lands of Texas, 1519-1970 24 (1972).
4 V. Westphall, Mercedes Reales, App. 5 at 286-88; J. McKnight, wThe Spanish
Watercounes of Te:u.a" in M. Forkosch, ed., Essays in Legal History in Honor of Felix
Frankfurter 373 n. 2 {Bobbs-Merrill 1966).
• J. Bowden, 6 Priuate Land Claims in the Southwest (LLM thesis, Southern
Methodiat Univenity, 1969) (available in Rare Book Room, University of New Mexico
Law Library).
• Hall, wGia.ot Before the Surveyor General: The Land Career of Donaciano Vigil,"
19 J. of the West 64 (1980).
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Confirmation of those grants potentially carried rights to those
incidental resources.?
Both because of the title to the land and the incidents that
title controlled, Spanish and Mexican land grants always have
provoked controversy. The pre-1848 archives of the American
Southwest, particularly New Mexico, are full of protests to the
making of and subsequent litigation over land grants.• United
States succession only intensified the battles.
The new federal government took it upon itself to pass on
the validity of land titles inherited from Spain or Mexico and
guaranteed by article VIII of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.•
The United States created various mechanisms to discharge
that self-imposed obligation, but each of them led to problems.10 Some critics said that the United States failed to
confirm some bona fide grants. 11 Others said that the United
States confirmed some fraudulent grants. 1 2 Still others accused
the federal government of correctly confirming grants in the
wrong size 13 or to the wrong confirmee.1•
The debates, then and now, focused on the problem of title
to land. However, underlying the making of grants in the first
place and overlaying the question of their adjudication by the
United States, there lurked the equally important question of
See, e.g., notes 60·72, 93-100, 158-165, 195 infra and accompanying text.
• Hall, "Juan Estevan Pino, Se Los Coma: New Mexico Land Speculation in the
1820's," 57 N. M. Hist. Reu. 27 (1982). See also D. Langum, Law and Community on
the Mexican California Frontier: Anglo-American Expatriates and the Clash of Legal
Tradition.,, 1821 -1846 (U. Okla. Press 1987).
• Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922 (1848).
10 M. Ebright, "New Mexican Land Grants: The Legal Background," 29-50 in C.
Briggs & J . Van Ness, eds., Land, Water, and Culture: New Perspectiues on Hispanic
Land Grant, (1987).
11 Ebright, "The Embudo Grant: A Case Study of Justice and the Court of Private
Land Claims," 19 J. of the West 74 (1980).
12 Ellis, "Fraud Without Scandal: The Roque Lovato Grant and Gaspar Ortiz y
Alarid." 57 N. M . Hi.st. Reu. 43 (1982).
13G. Julian, "Land Stealing in New Mexico," 145 N. Am. Reu. 17 (1 887) provides
an early list of grants that allegedly were confirmed for too much land. Ebright, "The
San Joaquin Grant: Who Owned the Common Lands? A Historical-Legal Puzzle," 57
N. M. Hist. Reu. 5 (1982) lists grants confirmed for too little land.
14 M. Ebright, The Tierra Amarilla Grant: A Hi&tory of Chicanery (1980).
7
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what additional rights attached to recognized legal title. In
particular, the adjudication of water and mineral rights that
might have been appurtenant to or reserved from Spanish and
Mexican land grants was as crucial to their value as the confirmation of their status as real property acquired prior to the
change in sovereignty.
Spanish and Mexican law, in the grand civil law tradition,
treated water and mineral rights as separate from the basic
surface estate that land grants conveyed. 19 Water rights arose
by grant or by implication or by adjudication, but in all cases,
as a separate added interest that required severance from the
royal or public domain in order to rise to the status of a private
"right." 1• Mineral rights, on the other hand, were severed from
the basic surface estate of which they were a part and "reserved" for separate disposition under different provisions of
Spanish and Mexican law.17 In other words, water rights might
be added to the pre-1846 land grant surface estate, but mineral
rights were always subtracted from it.
In the name of adjudicating these Spanish and Mexican
water and mineral rights, the United States took opposite
approaches to the handling of these basic resources. On the one
hand, while reserved under Spanish and Mexican law, mineral
rights in confirmed Spanish and Mexican land grants became,
by virtue of United States adjudication, an integral part of the
confirmed estate. 1a On the other hand, because they were
separate estates under Spanish and Mexican law, the United
States regarded the adjudication of rights to land as irrelevant
to rights to water that might go with them.1 •
Two Arizona cases near the turn of the 20th century, both
·involving the same land grant, illustrate the difference in
treatment of the mineral estate and water rights. Under the
1891 Act establishing the Court of Private Land Claims,20 the
See
See
17 See
1 • See
19 See

notes 32, 37, 139 infra and accompanying text.
notes 35-39 infra and accompanying ten.
notes 139-144 infra and accompanying text.
notes 72, 93 infra and accompanying text.
note 22 infra and accompanying text.
20 Act of Mar. 3, 1891 (establishing a Court of Private Land Claims), 26 Stat. 854,
ch. 539 (1891).
19

1•
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United States had judicially recognized the validity of the 1832
San Juan de Boquillas y Nogales land grant in southern Arizona.21 But that recognition only began the battle over the water
and mineral rights that attended the confirmed grant.
First the Arizona Territorial Supreme Court and then the
United States Supreme Court had to determine the nature and
extent of the water rights created by the Court of Private Land
Claims confirmation of the grant and the subsequent patenting
of it. The Supreme Court decided that federal patenting of the
grant created no new water rights, but only confirmed the water
rights that had existed on the land as of 1846. Without saying
what those rights were, the Supreme Court established Spanish
and Mexican water law as an open and continuing concern.22
Within twenty years, the same land grant became embroiled
in a battle over the effect of United States confirmation of the
mineral resources on the grant.23 Had the water principle
applied, the issue would have been left to Spanish and Mexican
law and the answer would have been easy: the land grant took
only the mineral resources specifically granted to it. Otherwise,
those mineral resources were reserved for a different disposal,
first to the Spanish and Mexican sovereigns and t hen to t he
United States as succeeding sovereign.
However, eventually United States adjudication reached a
tortured compromise. First, the courts read restrictively the
mineral reservation in the statute that authorized grant adjudication.u Then Congress took it upon itself to pass directly on
the parsed reading the Arizona courts had given the mineral
reservation and further gutted it. 2• As a result, the mineral and
surface estates of the San Juan de Boquillas land grant in
Arizona were merged, more or less, while the separate land and
water rights were left for different, later determinations.
21 Hearst v. United States, No. 42 Ct. of Priv. Land Cl., Ariz. Dist. (filed Oct. 9, 1892;
decided Feb. 14, 1899).
22 Boquilla.s Land & Cattle Company v. Curtis, 213 U.S. 339, 344 (1908).
23 Gallagher v. Boquilla.s Land & Cattle Company, 28 Ariz. 560, 238 P. 395 ( 1925).
24
29

238 P . at 397, 399.
Act of June 8, 1926, ch. 503, 44 Stat. 710 {codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 291 -293 (1 988)).
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This paper explores generally this paradoxical approach to
mineral and water rights on confirmed Spanish and Mexican
land grants. The analysis treats mineral and water rights
separately. For each critical land grant resource, the paper
explicates basic law of the Southwest's antecedent sovereigns.
It then suggests how those Spanish and Mexican rights fit
within the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo guarantee of
protection of "property rights." It proceeds to analyze how the
United States implemented those guarantees, suggesting that
the treatment of the succeeding sovereign owed more to its own
law than it did to the law of the antecedent sovereigns. Each
section concludes with an analysis of the very different problems that the contradictory handling of mineral and water
resources have left to the Southwest today. Finally, the paper
ends considering mineral and water resources together and
suggesting the continuing land grant legacy.
§ 1.02

The Mineral Resource Under Succeeding
Sovereigns

[1] The Mineral Estate in Spanish and Mexican
Law
From the beginning of Spain's ultramarine activities near the
turn of the 16th century, precious minerals provided the simultaneous impetus for further conquest and more refined legal
control.a. Spain established its dominion over the new world
and its putative gold and silver with both armies and lawyers.a?
The nature and extent of rights to minerals preoccupied the
Castillian monarchs for centuries. As the Crown struggled to
line its coffers with New World gold and silver, it worked to
forge a law of mining.
From the 15th to the 17th centuries, Royal lawyers struggled
to create a uniform law governing mineral development in the
New World.a. As with much of the special Spanish law
H See Moore v. Smaw & Fremont v. Flower, 17 Cal. 199, 213-15 ( 1861 ); see also C.
Prieto, Mining in the New World (1973).
27 J . H. Parry, The Spanish Theory of Empire in the Sixteenth Century 2-3 (1940).
H See Baade, "The Historical Background of Texu Water Law: A Tribute to Jack
Pope," 18 St. Mary '& L. J . l , 30-33 (1986) (hereafter Baade).
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applicable in the Indies, the law of mining surfaced slowly. It
rose out of particular edicts, delivered to different parts of the
New World at different times. From time to time, Royal lawyers
attempted to assemble and edit the disparate rulings into a
more comprehensive code. 29 Book IV, titles 18-22 of the 1680
Recopilacion de las Leyes del Reino de las Indias, including the
25 chapters of title 22 directed at mining in the Viceroyalty of
Peru, dealt more completely with mining in the New World
than any previous laws, but was still too incomplete and too
specific to be called a "code." 30 These first compilations of
Royal mining rules in the New World were supplemented by
civil law commentators who performed the critical function of
further synthesizing the fundamental principles of the law. In
the area of the mining law, the mid-18th century work of
Gamboa was particularly important in bringing together and
filling in the gaps of previous efforts.3 1
In all of these efforts to forge a unified, comprehensive,
systematic mining law for the New World, several underlying
principles remained constant. In the first place, New World
minerals belonged to the Royal Patrimony of the Crown of
Castille. Secondly, other parties could acquire rights to those
minerals only by a grant from the Crown and on the terms that
it specified. Thirdly, the Crown separated entirely rights to
minerals and rights to land so that land grants carried no right
to the mineral estate which was governed by different laws.
By the late 18th century, these fundamental principles were
embedded in the most complete formulation of mining law
un·der Spanish or Mexican rule, the 1783 "Royal Ordinances
for the Direction, Regulation, and Government of the Mine
Proprietors of New Spain and of its Royal Tribunal General." 32
The justly famous 1783 Mining Ordinance provided for the
H

Taylor, "Land and Water Rights in the Viceroyalty of New Spain," 50 N. M. Hist.

Rev. 1·5 (1975).
Baade, supra note 28, at 30-31 notes 170-172.
F. Gamboa, Commentarios a las Ordenanzas de Minas (1761}. There are various
English translations, the most accessible of which is in J . Rockwell, Spanish and
Mexican Law in Relation to Mines and Titles to Real Estate 113 (J. S. Voorhiea 1851).
32 J . Rockwell, Spanish and Mexican Law in Relation to Mines 25-111.
30 See

31
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search for, the discovery of, and the extraction of hard rock
minerals in the Viceroyalty of New Spain, including those parts
of the Southwest now in the United States. The 1783 Ordinance's 19 chapters and 246 sections governed what the code
itself called "the direction, regulation and government" of the
miners of New Spain. 33 The Ordinance covered everything
from mine dewatering to beneficiation to miners' working
conditions and grievances and, perhaps most importantly,
created a special "tribunal of miners," an elaborate system of
decentralized control over local mining a.ffairs.34 But from the
point of view of the subsequent acquisition of part of the
Viceroyalty of New Spain by the United States and the guarantees of the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, two general
aspects of the 1783 Ordinance are crucial.
First, the Ordinance's particular focus indicated that minerals were a special prerogative of the sovereign Crown of Castille, wholly different from the regalia in land or water. Land
grants had nothing to do with the mineral estate, although
mineral grants might include an interest in the surface estate.
Accordingly, land grant papers did not need to mention the
reservation of minerals in order to accomplish the split in
estates.3• Conversely, the 1783 Ordinance, based as it was on
the law of discovery, permitted every Spaniard or foreigner to
dig in search of minerals on his own land, the public domain,
or on the land of another. In this respect, the 1783 Ordinance's
split estates resembled the balance struck by a variety offederal
statutes including the 1916 Stock-Raising Homestead Act. 3 •
Actual discovery under the 1783 Ordinance's broad permit
to look led to a special, qualified right in the discoverer. Chapter
V set out the nature of the private "right" that could be
Id. at 25.
Id. ch. 1 at 27-33.
39 S. Scott, Las Siete Partida:J, partida II, tit. XV, Law 5 (1931 ). See also Schwarz
33
34

v. State, 703 S.W.2d 187, 190 (Tex. 1986).
H Carpenter, "Minerals as a Deterrent to Land Development," 51 Den. L. J. l (1974);
Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 462 U.S. 36 (1983). See the private right of eminent
domain conferred on miners in Rockwell, Spanish and Me:rican Law in Relation to
Mine, 79.
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acquired in minerals. Section 1 declared unequivocally that
minerals belonged to the Crown. Section 2 continued:
Without separating them from my Royal patrimony, I grant
them (the minerals) to my subjects in property and possession in such manner that they may sell, exchange (pass by
will, either in the way of inheritance or legacy) or in any other
manner, dispose of all their property in them upon the terms
on which they themselves possess it, and to persons legally
capable of acquiring it.37
Those familiar with the United States' subsequent 1872 Mining
Act will immediately recognize the similarity between these
special rights recognized by the 1783 Spanish Mining Ordinance and the rights that attach to unpatented mining claims
under the 1872 Act.3e In this context, the similarity raises real
questions about whether in actuality rights to mines acquired
under the 1783 Ordinance rose to the level of "present perfected
rights" entitled to protection under article 8 of the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo.3•
The 1783 Ordinance itself complicated that issue when it
added in section 3 of chapter V two conditions to the qualified
right which section 2 recognized. The first condition required
payment to the Royal fisc of a percentage of the value of the
minerals taken. The second imposed a requirement of not only
diligence, but actual operation, as a condition of the continued
recognition of the limited property right which discovery created."° Once again, both conditions foreshadowed different aspects of the subsequent mining law of the United States,41 and
Rockwell, supra note 36, at 45.
of May 10, 1872, 17 Stat. 91 (The General Mining Law of 1872). (codified
at 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1988)).
n For example, Freese v. United States, 639 F.2d 754 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
287 (1981), suggest. that a subsequent law which prevent. an unpatented mining claim
from going to patent ia not a "ta.king." For the parallel treaty issue, see, e.g., Fremont
v. United States, 18 U.S. (17 How.) 541 (1854).
40 Rockwell, supra note 36 at 79.
41 Compare the $100 per claim work obligation under the General Mining Law of
1872, 30 U.S.C. § 28, with the corresponding obligation under the Spanish code to keep
a mine operating.
37

38 Act
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both conditions raised interesting theoretical issues under the
Treaty which transferred sovereignty.42
In any case, the 1783 Ordinance itself survived the change
in sovereignty in 1821 from Spain to Mexico with the Mexican
Nation after 1824, if not before, succeeding to the rights of the
Crown of Castille. 43 Mexico adopted the mining laws of Spain
and applied them directly in the territories of what became New
Mexico and, for a short period, indirectly in the Mexican states
whose jurisdiction included parts of Texas and Arizona.44
Of course, after 1821 , Mexico had full municipal authority
over new mining claims on the public domain. In the exercise
of that power, it only made explicit the implicit separation of
mineral and surface estates that Spain previously had operated
under. In a regulation adopted at nearly the same time as
sovereignty over the southwest changed again, this time from
Mexico to the United States, Mexico expressly excepted minerals from all lands granted for colonization. 4• This regulation
may or may not have applied, but it only made explicit what
the previous law had implied: the surface estate and the mineral
estate were entirely distinct, with different sources: title to land
came from land grants; claims to minerals came from the
mining law.
Of course, Spanish and Mexican mining law in the sout hwest
incidentally concerned itself with land and water, just as subsequent United States mining law allowed access to surface
resources ancillary to the discovery and development of minerals.'" Chapter 13, section 3 of the 1783 Mining Ordinance, for
42 Compare Fremont v. United States, 18 U.S. (17 How.) 541 (1854) with Dent v.
Emmeger, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 308, 312 (1 871) for the Supreme Court's treatment of
conditions u imposed by the antecedent sovereign and inherited by t he succeeding
sovereign.
43 Baade, "The Historical Background of Te:i:u Water Law," 18 St. Mary's L. J. 1,
26-36 (1986).
44 fd. at 29.
4 9 Article 21 of Regulations of December 24, 1846 in Reynolds, S panish and Mexican
Land Laws; New Spain and Mexico 263 ( 1895).
,.. See, e.g., Free Timber or T imber Cutting Act, Act of June 3, 1878, 20 Stat. 88;
P . Gates, Hi.story of Public Land Law Deuelopment 552 (U.S.G.P .O. 1979 ).
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example, allowed mineral discoverers a sufficient amount of
grazing land to keep animals necessary for driving mining
machinery and sufficient water for the continuous operation
that the Ordinance contemplated. Apparently, the Ordinance
made these uses paramount but limited in time. A miner could
commandeer already privatized lands and water for these
purposes, but only if he paid and only for the time the ancillary
resources were needed in mining. 4 7 Otherwise, the owner's
consent was required.
The requirements of the 1783 Ordinance were played out
throughout the southwest prior to 1848, but the 1833 Ortiz
Mine grant southeast of Santa Fe shows it in operation. Antonio Barreiro, a Chihuahua attorney on loan to Santa Fe in the
1830s, may have been correct when he bemoaned in his 1832
Ojeada Sohre Nuevo Mexico ... the woeful lack of legal knowledge on Mexico's northern frontier, but Francisco Ortiz and
Ignacio Cano knew the 1783 Ordinance chapter and verse when
in November and December, 1833, they applied for and received
the mine and supporting surface and water resources necessary
for the continuous operation that the Ordinance contemplated.••
The process began when Ortiz and Cano, who had purchased
the interests of two earlier discoverers of a rich vein of gold
in the Ortiz mountains, registered the claim before the Alcalde
of Santa Fe on November 15, 1833, as the 1783 Ordinance said
they should.so In turn, the Alcalde directed the two registrants
to open an exploratory shaft of specific size called for by the
Ordinance along the vein and informed them that, if the shaft
confirmed the discovery, he could give them possession of the
mine. When, less than a month later, Ortiz and Cano informed
the Alcalde that they had completed the exploratory work, the
4 7 Rockwell, Spanish and Mexican Law in Relation to Mines 79 ( 1783 Mining
Ordinance) .
.q A. Barreiro, "Ojeada Sabre Nuevo Mexico," (1832) in H . Caroll & J. Haggard. eds.,
Three New Mexico Chronicles 47-49 (1942).
•• J . Bowden, Private Land Claims in the Southwest 491 (the Ortiz Mine grant)
(hereafter Private Land Claims).
so Id. at 491-92_

§ 1.02[1]
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Alcalde assembled the technical crew called for by the 1783
Ordinance, inspected the site and shaft, found both satisfactory, and put the applicants in possession of a tract of land
surrounding the mine. s1
Two aspects of the Ortiz Mine grant deserve special attention. In the first place, officials and private parties alike followed precisely the procedures detailed by the formal law.
Secondly, the grant of land connected with the gold discovery
was limited in two important senses. [t wai limited in space
to a small area of no more than five acres necessary for the
working of the vein. 92 It was limited in time to the period during
which the actual mining operation continued." As such, the
mining grant itself represented an arealy small, resourcespecific temporary privatization of the Mexican public domain.
However, the Ortiz Mine grant turned out to be as important
for the incidental land and water resources it commandeered
as it was for the direct claim it created on the nation's minerals.
The original applicants, in addition to their mineral request,
also petitioned local authorities for an exclusive grant to the
water from springs near the mines necessary for the mining
operation.M Both the 1783 Ordinance and Ortiz and Cano saw
water as the "necessary glove of water for the hand of mining,"
as the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals said almost 200 years
later in a mining case subsequently reversed by the United
States Supreme Court ... But the Spanish law applicable in
Mexican New Mexico made it clear that the formal private right
to that public water had to come from a separate, explicit water
grant.se The Alcalde of Santa Fe made it clear in December
1833 when, pursuant to chapter 13, section 3 of the 1783 Mining
s1 Id. at 492-93.
s2 Rockwell, supra note 47, at 50.

Id. at 51-52. Compare the relocation provisions of the General Mining Law of 1872,
30 U.S.C. § 28, and the abandonment provisions of § 314 of the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. § 1744(c) (1982).
M Bowden, supra note 49, at 492-94.
u Andrua v. Charlestone Stone Products Co., 553 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1977), reu'd,
436 U.S. 604 ( 1978).
M See notes 140-141 infra and accompanying tert.
U
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Ordinance, he granted the mining applicants the springs near
the Ortiz Mine.•7

In addition to the minerals and the waters, Ortiz and Cano
also requested as part of their 1833 petition a grant of land to
support the gold mining operation. At the same time that the
Alcalde granted the applicants the mine and the water, he also
granted them from the unappropriated public domain "four
leagues square" in the vicinity for pasturing the animals necessary to work the mine. The area turned out to contain 69,000
acres.58
As of 1848, the Ortiz Mine grant represented a complex group
of direct and ancillary claims to real property once a part of
the Mexican public domain. The ore body represented the core
of those rights. Even rights to it were conditional, both on
mining operation and on payment of the governmental share.
In addition, as ancillary rights, the Ortiz Mine carried with it
separate grants of both land and water. These also may have
been conditioned on the requirement of mining operations.
[2] Mining Rights in California Under the Treaty
of Guadalupe Hidalgo

On the change from Mexican to United States sovereignty
in 1848, it is doubtful that anyone fully understood how this
congerie of rights and conditions fit into the property guarantee
provisions of article 8 of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. 59
However, all Mexicans understood that land grants carried
none of the mineral rights which were reserved for separate
treatment. In the discharge of its rights as succeeding sovereign
and .its obligations to international treaty, the United States
stood both of these principles on their heads. It recognized a
complete right to minerals without condition and, in the name
of the Treaty, it conveyed that complete right to the owners
of the surface estates."
Bowden, supra note 49, at 492-94.
H. R. Rep. No. 28. 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 55-58 (186 1).
•• 9 Stat. 922 (1848) . See also Mawn, "A Land Grant Guarantee: T he T reaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo or the Protocol of Queretaro?" 14 J. of the West 52-53 (1975).
H See notes 70-75 infra and accompanying text.
S7
H
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The process of United States transformation in the name of
confirmation began, appropriately enough, in California. In
order to determine what land in that state belonged to the
federal public domain and what land already had passed into
private ownership under the laws of Spain and Mexico as
guaranteed by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Congress
established the California Lands Commission in 1851.•1 That
first step to the adjudication of rights to southwestern land
originating in the law of the area's antecedent sovereigns
marked the beginning of federal transformation of Spanish and
Mexican rights to minerals and land in the name of confirming
them.
The 1851 Act began that process of transformation simply
by its existence. The property guarantees of article 8 of the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo might have been self-executing,
thus carrying directly into United States sovereignty rights
created under the antecedent sovereign without first filtering
those rights through an adjudication by the succeeding sovereign. H Obviously, the adjudication process established under
the 1851 California Lands Commission Act belied that selfexecuting approach.
But the 1851 Act went farther. In addition to offering the
imprimatur of federal recognition to rights to land originating
under Spain and Mexico, the adjudications under the Act
became both comprehensive and preclusive. In order to survive
the change to United States sovereignty, claims to California
property originating under the state's antecedent sovereigns
had to be p1esented within two years to the California Lands
Commission and confirmed by it.u Otherwise, the claims were
barred, the alleged rights extinguished, and the land was available for disposal or retention as federal public domain. The
obligation to file, and the penalty of forfeiture for failure to do
so under the 1851 Act, extended to sovereign and private

•1Act of March 3, 1851. ch. 41, 9 Stat. 631.
u M. Ebright, "New Mexico Land Grants: The Legal Background.~ 48-49 and notes
176-177_ in C. Briggs & J . Van Ness, eds., Land, Water and Culture (1987).

u Act of March 3, 1851, ch. 41, 9 Stat. 631.
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claimants alike and reached all manner of "possessory interests" in real property ..... No review by a succeeding sovereign
of property rights guaranteed by a treaty or international law,
before or since, went so far in remaking those rights in the
image of the new government. u
This exclusive federalization of Spanish and Mexican property rights had two critical effects on mineral rights in California originating under Spanish and Mexican law. The limited
property in mines allowed under the 1783 Mining Ordinance
may or may not have been sufficiently "perfected" to meet the
subsequent tests for entitlement to Treaty protection... But,
in any case, the Spanish and Mexican "property" in mines was
sufficiently "possessory" to bring it within the 1851 Act's exclusive and preclusive provisions.• 7
However, no claim to a mine based on Spanish and Mexican
law was finally confirmed under the procedures of the California Lands Commission Act... Recent decisions reaffirm the fact
that mineral claims not presented to and confirmed by the
Lands Commission cannot be resurrected now.
Paradoxically, under the 1851 Act for California, the adjudication of the separate and servient surface estate in lands had
the most direct effect on the dominant and distinct mineral
interest in lands. Early California courts recognized correctly
that Spain and Mexico had reserved the mineral estate from
94 Summa Corp. v. California e:t rel. Stat e Lands Comm'n , 466 U.S. 198 (1984);
Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 U.S. 238 (1889).
H Contrast, for example, treatment of the issue of acquired rights in United States
v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 50 (1833).
M See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
e7 Summa Corp., 466 U.S. 198, 206-07 n. 4, implies that the preclusive effect of the
1851 Act reaches all "rights of permanent occupancy." Comment, "A New Approach
to Spanish and Mexican Land Grants and t he Public Trust Doctrine: Defining the
Property Interest Protected by the T reaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo,- 33 U. C.l.A. L. Reu.
1364, 1370 (1986).
H 2 Am. L. of Mining § 13.02(2] (2d ed. 1984). The Supreme Court rejected the
infamous California claim to the New Almaden Quicksilver Mine. See United States
v. Castillero, 67 U.S. 396 (1864). The Ortiz Mine grant was a New Mexico mining grant
that was confirmed as a surface grant which c · -:ed mineral.I. See notes 111-114 infra
and accompanying text.
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surface land grants and held them open for prospecting, discovery, and location even after the grant had been made.•• When
this decision unleashed a horde of California prospectors onto
private Spanish and Mexican land grants in the state, applying
the rule of separate estates became a real problem.To Courts
solved it and did so in a way that sent Spanish and Mexican
titles in the Southwest farther from their civil law origins and
closer to their federal confirmations.
Under the 1851 California Lands Commission Act, an approved claim entitled the petitioner to a United States patent
for the lands confirmed. Using federal patent law, United States
courts reunited the surface and mineral estates that Spanish
and Mexican law had severed. Early decisions made it clear that
a federal patent confirming a Spanish and Mexican land grant
functioned as both a federal recognition of the validity of the
Spanish and Mexican rights and a quitclaim of all United
States interest in the property. 71 Even if the mineral estate had
been reserved to the national sovereign under Spanish and
Mexican law, the United States had succeeded to the rights so
reserved and had transferred them for the first time to the land
grant patentee when it issued its patent. In effect, the federal
patent for land not only confirmed that the surface estate was
private property, but also granted the mineral estate to the
confirmee for the first time. 72
Then California, and subsequently United States, Supreme
Court C'1ief Justice Steven Field had strong policy reasons for
merging the surface and mineral estates on confirmed California land grants. But he knew that in the name of confirming
rights acquired under the United States' antecedent sovereigns,
he was adding to them. He found his authority to do so in the
n Moore v. Smaw&: Fremont v. Flower, 17 Cal. 199, 212-13 (1861).
TO Comment, ~New Approach to Land Grant.,," 33 U.C.L.A. L. Reu. 1364, 1387 n.
102 (1986).
71 Beard v. Federy, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 478, 491 (1865). Accord Botiller v. Dominguez,
130 U.S. 238, 249 (1889).
72 In effect, the patent passed the mineral estate de novo when the United States
confirmed the limited Mexican estate. See Tameling v. United States Freehold &:
Emigration Co., 93 U.S. (3 Otto) 644, 663 (1876) for similar de novo construction of
a confirmatory federal patent.
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congressional language of the 1851 Act establishing the California Lands Commission. Specifically, when the Act spoke of
"settling" claims originating under Spain and Mexico, it meant
more than simply recognizing acquired rights. In fact, held
Field, that language in the Act evidenced Congress' intent that
the recognition should pass all interest of the federal government including the mineral estate which Spain and Mexico had
reserved.n
That view of the effect of the 1851 statute put the mineral
estate on confirmed Spanish and Mexican land grants in California beyond the proprietary reach of the federal or state
governments. The patents, including the mineral estate, are
conclusive against any further claims of the United States or
anyone claiming under it. 74 Despite the fact that the patents'
language purports to affect only the rights of the United States
and those claiming under them and not other "third parties,"
the patent is also conclusive against all third parties except
those who can trace a superior right stemming directly from
a sovereign act of the antecedent sovereign. H
The 1851 Act and the patents issued pursuant to it prevent
challenge in California to the merged surface and mineral
estates on confirmed Mexican land grants in one additional
way. The 1851 Act established a two-year deadline for the filing
of claims originating under Spanish and Mexican law. The
United States Supreme Court recently has affirmed that the
deadline applied to all possessory rights in California land
originating under the law of the antecedent sovereigns and to
all parties including the State of California.7 •
Thus, under California law, continued and still unrecognized
rights to minerals originating in Spanish and Mexican land
grants have been cut off in three ways. The patents issued by
7~ Moore v. Smaw, 17 Cal. at 223-24; Blue v. McKay, 136 F. Supp. 315 (D.C. Cir.
1955).
74 United States v. O'Donnell, 303 U.S. 501 (1938).
H Comment, ~New Approach to Land Granut 33 U. C.L.A. L. Rev. 1364, 1389-95
(1986).
7 • Summa Corp. v. California, 466 U.S. 198 (1984); City of Los Angeles v. Venice
Peninaula Properties, 205 Cal. App. 3d 1522, 253 Cal. Rptr. 331 {Cal. App. 2 Diat. 1988).
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the United States to confirm private ownership include the
mineral estate despite the fact that under the law of the
antecedent sovereigns that estate was severed and reserved.77
Those United States patents are not subject to collateral attack
by third parties despite the fact that the patents themselves
state that they only affect the rights of the United States.7•
Those United States patents are final despite the fact that the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo says that Mexican property of
every kind shall be "inviolably" n respected. As a result, in
California, the mineral examiner dealing with land whose title
originates in a Mexican land grant faces the relatively mundane
task of determining the state of the title since the issuance of
the federal patent confirming the grant.

[3] Spanish and Mexican Mineral Rights in Texas
Every school boy (at least every Texas school boy) knows
that the Republic of Texas succeeded directly to the Mexican
public domain and did not cede that public domain to the
United States when it joined the United States. 80 With respect
to Spanish and Mexican land grants, Texas, not the United
States, dealt with the problem of rights acquired or reserved
under the law of the antecedent sovereigns. Texas did so in its
own unique way, but, in the end, arrived at the same yoking
of surface and mineral estates that Spain and Mexico had
worked so hard to keep apart.
Texas adjudicated the validity of land grants and their associated mineral rights in a variety of ways. The 1836 Texas
constitution declared invalid all Mexican grants made after
November 13, 1835.•1 Thereafter, the republic, then state,
either required title holders to register land claims originating
under the antecedent sovereignsa2 or, in the area between the
77 See

notes 71-74 supra and accompanying text.

7• See note 75 supra and accompanying text.

79 See note 76 supra and accompanying text.
NT. Miller, The Public Lands of Te:cas, 1519-1970 xi (1972); Act of Sept. 9, 1850,
ch. 49, 9 Stat. 446.
TeL Const.• art. 13, § 2. See also l Gammel's Laws of Te:c0$ 1081 (1836).
a l Gammel's Laws of Texas 1324 (1836).
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Nueces and Rio Grande Rivers covered by the 1848 Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo,93 established special land commissions to
report land claims to the state legislature for its action .... Still
later, Texas passed acts waiving its sovereign immunity and
permitting claimants under Spanish or Mexican grants made
during specified times and in particular places to sue the state
to establish the title ... By whatever method of approval, Spanish and Mexican land titles were brought under Texas
sovereignty.
Whatever mineral interests Spain and Mexico might have
retained in these lands thus passed to the state of Texas. What
the United States accomplished in California with its patents,
Texas accomplished with its constitution. Under its 1866 constitution, the state of Texas released to surface owners, including grant owners, all its interest in mines and mineral substances." As a result, the grantee of any valid and recognized
Spanish or Mexican land grant in Texas now owns the surface
estate by virtue of the confirmation of the previous title he had
acquired under the antecedent sovereign and the mineral estate
he had acquired directly from the state of Texas.
Ironically, perhaps, Spanish and Mexican mining law continues to apply in Texas in a way that it does not in the rest of
the Southwest, primarily now as a standard point of departure
in the analysis of the extent of mineral rights created by
subsequent grants from the Texas public domain. The Texas
courts most recently had occasion to resort to this inherited
sovereign interest in a 1986 case involving a 1947 state patent
for a 1897 purchase of state land authorized by an 1895 Texas
statute which "withheld" from conveyance and thus "reserved"
in the state all minerals.• 7 In construing what minerals were
u Comment, -A New Approach to Spanish and Merican Land Granta." 33 U.C.L.A.
L. Rev. 1364 n. 1 (1986).
M 3 Gammel's Laws of Texas 42-43. 53. 582, 889, 941-48, 1362, 1533.
H Id. at 381, 1471. The acts waived sovereign immunity for grants made prior to
December 19, 1836 and situated between the Nueces River and the Rio Grande, east
of the mouth of Moros Creek. 2 Am. L. of Mining § 13.02[ll[e) (2d ed. 1984).
H 5 Gammel', Laws of Texas 880 (1898).
87 Schwan v. State, 703 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. 1986); Baade, "The Historical Background
of Texas Water Law.~ 18 St. Mary 's L. J . 1, 1-4 (1986).
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thus reserved, the Texas courts refused to apply the usual
"surface destruction" test applied in Texas ... Instead, the
Schwartz court held that in the initial transfer of public land
into private ownership, a reservation of "all of the minerals"
applied to all minerals "whether or not recovery of such would
destroy or deplete the surface estate." As "empirical evidence"
supporting this interpretation, the Texas Supreme Court resorted to "applicable Mexican law ... enacted long before
either the Mexican or the Texan revolution."•
The holding and decision brought a sharp concurring opinion
accusing the majority of the Schwarz court of continuing a
"quagmirish fog ... where nobody knows who owns what (not
even a title examiner) until ownership has been litigated ...."" However, the complaint was at least as much directed at the majority's failure to clarify the Texas law of
private mineral reservation as it was directed at the Schwarz
court's forging of a special rule for public mineral reservations.
With respect to the latter, the law of Texas' antecedent sovereigns requires an absolute separation of the two estates that
the state did not recognize in its land grant confirmation.

[ 4) Spanish and Mexican Mineral Rights in New
Mexico, Arizona, and Colorado
In New Mexico, Arizona, and Colorado, the relationship of
Spanish and Mexican mineral law to the current law of minerals on land grant lands arrives at practically the same place
as it does in California. But the route to confirmation is both
more circuitous and more complex than in California, and the
final decision is not quite so cast in stone. As a result, the status
of the present ownership of con.firmed grants is more Byzantine. These added layers of complexity result partially from the
longer and more intense history of land tenure, especially in
New Mexico, prior to the change in sovereignty,•1 and partially
M

Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1977); Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex.

1980).

• Schwan u. Stau, 703 S. W.2d at 189.
N Id. at 193.
Hall, Book Review, 64 N. M. Hi.&t. Reu. 470 (1989) (reviewing D. Langum, Law

•1

and Community on the Mexican California Frontier (U. OltJa. Presa 1987).
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from the different methods that Congress authorized for the
confirmation of property in the area.
Here Congress began with the 1854 Act establishing the
office of the Surveyor General for New Mexico. 92 Section 8
directed that Surveyor General to investigate titles originating
under the antecedent sovereigns. Specifically, he was to "ascertain the origin, nature, character and extent of all claims
to lands under the laws, usages and customs of Spain and
Mexico." He was to report his findings to Congress itself for
its final decision as to whether and on what terms the grant
should be confirmed. Initial instructions from the Department
of Interior to the first Surveyor General for New Mexico
indicated that, in making his recommendations to Congress, the
Surveyor General should place himself where Mexico would
have been had sovereignty not changed, and honor only those
property rights which Mexico would have been legally compelled to honor.ea Obviously, Mexico would not have been
obligated to recognize that bona fide land grants included the
mineral estate and the Surveyor General for New Mexico would
have violated his instructions had he recommended that land
grants included minerals.
But like the 1851 Act for California, the 1854 Act for New
Mexico (including Colorado and Arizona) failed to deal explicitly with the mineral aspect of Spanish and Mexican land
grants. The 1854 Act did not specifically reserve from the
surface estate the mineral estate that Spanish and Mexican law
would have witheld from surface grants. In fact, both the 1851
and 1854 Acts said nothing about minerals and the land grants
to which they were directed....
H Act of July 22, 1854, ch. 103, § 8, 19 Stat. 308 (applicable only to New Mexico
Territory which then included Colorado). Amendatory acts can be found in the Act of
Feb. 28, 1861, 12 Stat. 172 (extending the 1854 Act to grants in Colorado and establishing the office of Surveyor General for Colorado), and Act of Feb. 24, 1863, 12 Stat. 664
(extending the 1854 Act to the Arizona Territory).
Instructions, Wilson, Commissioner of General Land Office to Pelham, Surveyor
General for New Mexico, August 21, 1854, in Miscellaneous Records, Surveyor General

•:a

for New Me:i:ico (Sa.Dta Fe, New Mexico). See Hall, Four Leagues of Pecos 79 n. 39

{U.N.M. Presa 1984).
M See Lockhardt v. Johnson, 181 U.S. 516, 526 {1901).
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In other ways which bore indirectly on the problem of the
mineral estate in con.firmed grants, the procedures under the
1854 Act differed from those established under the 1851 Act.
In California, the Lands Commission and then the courts on
review were charged with determining the validity of claims
originating under Spain and Mexico. The 1854 Act moved that
final responsibility from the executive and judicial branches to
the legislative branch and from the courts to Congress. The
shift had important consequences on jurisdiction to review land
grant determinations under the 1854 Act. 95 In addition, the
1854 Act placed the burden of proceeding on the United States,
not the claimants, and, unlike the 1851 Act, imposed no deadline on filing a claim... Finality under the 1854 Act would have
to stem from a different source than it had in California.
The early course of the effect of United States confirmation
of Spanish and Mexican land grants in the area covered by the
1854 Act paralleled the course of events in California. Initially,
New Mexico courts, correctly interpreting Spanish and Mexican law, suggested in dicta that confirmed New Mexico land
grants did not include the mineral estate because the antecedent sovereigns had reserved that for separate disposition.97
Shortly thereafter, the New Mexico courts decided it was the
wiser course to reunite the estates that the law of the antecedent sovereigns so assiduously had kept apart ... But because the
process of confirmation of land grants was different under the
1854 Act than it had been under the 1851 Act, the constitutional
route to the reunification under United States law was slightly
different.
In the case of California, the courts had focussed on the
patents in order to find that in con.firming grants there, the
1851 Act had added the mineral estate to the surface estate of
H

Tameling v. United States Freehold & Emigration Co., 93 U.S. 644 ( 1876). See

auo n. 101 infra and accompanying text.

N Act of July 22, 1854, ch. 103, § 8, 10 Stat. 308. Besides imposing no deadline. the
1854 Act did not require submission of "perfect" grants for confirmation.
97 United States v. San Pedro & Canon del Agua Mining Co., 4 N.M. 405, 17 P. 337
(1888), aff'd on other grounds, 146 U.S. 120 (1892).
"Catron v. Laughlin. 11 N.M. 604, 632, 72 P. 26 (1903).
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confirmed grants." Now, in the southwest covered by the 1854
Act, the courts focussed on the different process of confirmation in order to reach the same result. Specifically, the courts
found that Congress itself had added the mineral estate to land
grants and that that legislative decision was not reviewable by
the judicial branch of government.100
The seminal cases involved the quantity of land confirmed
in the name of land grants, not the estates attached to them.
In one instance, Congress directly had confirmed a grant, partly
in New Mexico and partly in Colorado, that by universal
admission was ten times as large as Mexican law would have
allowed. When the size was challenged, the United States
Supreme Court held that the direct congressional confirmation
of the grant, even in its excessive size, could not be reviewed
in the courts and that the title passed by that legislative act
was as effective and complete "as a grant de novo." 101
Of course, the land confirmed that exceeded the land allowed
by Mexican law in fact was a grant de novo of the federal public
domain. But by an analogy that the courts quickly adopted,
legislative confirmations added the mineral estate to recognized
land grants as surely as they had increased their size. The
courts could correct neither incorrect interpretation of the law
of the antecedent sovereign. With land grant confirmation
under the 1854 Act, Congress had made a grant de novo of the
mineral estate. The legislative branch of government, not the
courts, had made the choice and only Congress, if anyone, could
correct it. 102
Congress attempted to do so in the 1891 Act establishing the
Court of Private Land Claims. 103 Concerned with precisely the
excesses that the unreviewable legislative grants de novo had
" See notes 71-72 supra and accompanying text.
100 United States v. Maxwell Land-Grant Case, 121 U.S. 325 (1887); Tameling v.
United States Freehold & Emigration Co., 93 U.S. 644 (1876).
101 Ta.meling v. United States Freehold & Emigration Co., 93 U.S. 644, 663 (1876).
102 /d. at 663; Astiazaran v. Santa Rita Land & Mining Co., 148 U.S. 80, 82·83 (1893);
H.N.D. Land Co. v. Suazo, 44 N.M. 547, 105 P.2d 744 (1940); Martinez v. Mundy, 61
N.M. 87, 295 P .2d 209 (1956).
1 N Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 539, 26 Stat. 854.
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led to, Congress reversed most of the procedures of the 1854
Act. 104 Now Congress explicitly addressed not only the size of
grants to be confirmed but the mineral estate attached to them.
Specifically, Congress now stated that "allowance or confirmation of a land grant claim" under the 1891 Act would confer
no "right or title to any gold, silver or quicksilver mines or
minerals of the same." Instead, "all such mines and minerals"
would remain the property of the United States, subject to
disposition according to special rules which the Act specified.1oa
In effect, the 1891 Act reinstituted the accurate view of the
separation between mineral and surface estates that Spanish
and Mexican law had imposed.
However, as soon as the effect of this specific legislative
provision reached the judiciary for interpretation, the courts
once again reunited as far as possible the split estates that now
both the law of the antecedent and succeeding sovereigns
imposed. As noted above, in the second of the Boquillas Land
and Cattle Company cases involving mineral rights on the
con.firmed San Juan de las Boquillas grant, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the confirmation and patenting of the
grant under the 1891 Act passed title to all minerals except
gold, silver, and quicksilver specifically mentioned in the
Act. 11,e With respect to those three named minerals, the patent
under the Act reserved only actual mines or deposits known
at the time of the patent "to contain minerals of such extent
and value as to justify expenditures for the purpose of extracting them, including the minerals of such mines." 1 0 7 Students
of the United States' hard rock mining law will recognize in
this restrictive Arizona Supreme Court ruling something akin
to the old- Castle u. Womble test for the discovery of "valuable
minerals" on the federal public domain. 108 In the context of
104 Comment, "History and Adjudication of the Common Lands of Spanish and
Mexican Land Grants," 25 Nat. Res. J. 1039 (1985). R. Bradfute, The Court of Private
Land Claim& (1982) passim. Loclthardt v. Johnson, 181 U.S. 516, 522-23 (1900).
1oe Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 539, § 13, 26 Stat. 854, 860.
1 oe Gallagher v. Boquillu Land & Cattle Co., 28 Ariz. 560, 238 P . 395 (1925).
107 238 P. at 399.
1 M Castle v. Womble, 19 L.D. 455, 457 (1894), apprv 'd, Chrisman v. Miller, 197 U.S.

313, 322 (1905).
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the reservation contemplated by section 13 of the Act of 1891,
the Arizona court had gone as far as it could to minimize the
split estates that the 1891 Act had created.
Congress had stood by while the courts rewrote Spanish and
Mexican mining law to transfer reserved minerals to land grant
confirmees under the 1851 California and 1854 New Mexico
processes. In the 1891 Act, Congress acted prospectively only
when it repealed the 1854 Act and established the Court of
Private Land Claims. 1 " Now, however, in the face of the 1925
decision of the Arizona Supreme Court, Congress acted again.
One year after the Gallagher decision and in response to it,
Congress passed a statute authorizing the Secretary of the
Interior to lease on a royalty basis to the land grant confirmee
"all gold, silver, or quicksilver deposits or mines or minerals
of the same." 11 0 The language of the 1926 statute tracked
precisely the reservation imposed by section 13 of the 1891 Act.
Neither the legislative history nor the subsequent administrative rulings show whether, in addition, Congress intended in
the statute to adopt the parsed reading that the Arizona Supreme Court had given to the 1891 Act.
Once again, the adjudication of the Ortiz Mine grant under
United States rule shows something of the tangled complexity
that the 1854 and 1891 Acts added to the problem of mineral
rights on Spanish and Mexican land grants in the territory
covered by those Acts. Recall that under the Mexican law that
applied in 1833 when the grant was made, the Ortiz Mine grant
represented a congeries of direct but limited (both in space and
time) rights to the gold vein discovered there and entirely
ancillary rights to sufficient land and water necessary to exercise the primary rights. 111 Theoretically, it is not even certain
that the combination of rights and conditions and limitations
that the grant represented rose to the level of what the United
States courts would have regarded as "property" protected
under article 8 of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. 11 :1 Be that
109 Loclthardt

u. Johruon., supra note 104 at 522-23.
Act of June 8, 1926, ch. 503, 44 Stat. 710 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 291-293 (1988)).
111 See notea 48-58 supra and accompanying text.
11 a See note 59 supra and accompanying tert.
1 10
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as it may, under the Act of 1854, Congress confirmed the Ortiz
Mine grant as a land grant of 69,000 acres. 11 3 Under the federal
common law of land grant s, confirmation of the Ortiz Mine
grant incidentally carried with it title to all the minerals on it
or under it, including the vein of gold, the discovery of which
had allowed Ortiz into the limited world of mine grants authorized by the 1783 Mining Ordinance. 1 14 Thus federal confirmation of the Ortiz grant in the name of the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo dealt with the grant in terms of the wrong resourcethe surface, not the mineral, estate-and in the wrong way-by
including the minerals rather than reserving them for separate
disposition.
The irony of this compounded error was that in the area
covered by the 1854 Act, mineral problems became land problems. Many of the spectacular battles over the ownership of
land grants that followed confirmation under either the 1854
or 1891 Acts masked a struggle over the minerals now for the
first time a part of the surface estate. Land grant boundaries
were stretched and altered to include lode deposits of valuable
minerals.1u Parties jockeyed for the control of land grants
knowing that ownership now commanded the mineral est ate. 1H
Indeed, some of the largest and most controversial of the
confirmed grants developed programs of their own allowing for
the discovery and development of the minerals on the kingdoms
of grass that Congress had confirmed in the grant. 1n
Some esoteric problems linger from the adjudications authorized by statute. No court or administrative agency has yet
decided that in excepting certain minerals from grants confirmed unde~ the 1891 Act, Congress intended to pass all others
to the surface confirmee. Neither Congress nor the Department
113 Act of March l, 1861 to Confirm Certain Private Land Claims in the Territory
of New Mexico, ch. 66, 12 Stat. 887 (1861).
114 See notes 32-40 supra and accompanying text.
119 See, e.g., Pueblo of Santo Domingo v. Leland Thompson, 708 F. Supp. 1206
(D.N.M. 1989).
11• G. Hall, Four Leagius of Pecos 171-81 (U ..N.M. Presa 1984).
117 "Regulations for mineral prospectors and intending locators upon the Maxwell
Land Grantt April 15, 1897, filed for record the same day in the Office of the County
C\etk, Colfax County, Raton, New Mexico, in Mining Book I at page 389.
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of Interior have further interpreted the 1926 statute which
authorizes leasing of the excepted minerals to the surface
owner.1 1 •
Instead, the remaining problems of minerals on lands confirmed in private ownership under the 1854 or 1891 Acts primarily involve the continuing problem of land titles. Unlike the
situation in California, neither the 1854 nor the 1891 Acts bars
the assertion even today of a "perfect" right to land, including
the mineral estate, under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.
Claims still arise. 11 •
However, a mineral title examiner will confront severe title
problems when dealing even with confirmed land grants. With
some, he (or she) will find that Congress patented a confirmed
private land grant to the undetermined heirs of a person who
died in the 18th century. 120 In some instances, subsequent
courts have determined who those heirs might have been at a
particular time, but the ownership interests thereafter have
slipped back into the obscurity of intestate succession, unprobated estates, and unrecorded deeds. 121
The problem becomes even more difficult with respect to socalled community land grants. In New Mexico, some community grants operate under specific statutes. 122 A general statute
governs others.12~ And still others claim the status of community grants now even though they began as and were confirmed
as private grants. In any case, the prospective developer of
minerals on these lands must deal with the possible ownership
interest of individual grant residents on the mineral resources
of the community grant.124
2 Am. L. of Minin, § 13.02[31(bl(iii] (2d ed. 1984).
v. New Mexico and Arizona Ry., 175 U.S. 76 (1899), re1J'g 4 Ariz. 236, 36
P. 316 (1894).
120 See, e.g., Montoya v. Unknown Heirs of Vigil, 16 N.M. 349, 120 P.2d 1237 (1911).
121 See, e.g., Apodaca v. Tome Land & Improvement Co. (NSC), 91 N.M. 591, 577
P.2d 1237 (1977).
122 See, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. § 49-10·1 (1978) (governing the confirmed Tecolote
Community Land Grant).
1u ld. at § 49-2-1.
124 Kavanaugh v. Delgado, 35 N.M. 141, 290 P. 798 (1930).
11•

119 Ainsa

§ 1.03[1]

MINERAL LA w I N STITUTE

1-28

In one sense, reuniting the mineral and surface estates of
New Mexico land grants under United States law promised to
simplify title to the resources and control over them. Ironically.
however, combining title to land grant minerals and title to land
grant lands only made access to minerals dependent on almost
inscrutable title to New Mexico land grant lands. In California,
the land title situation is much clearer and so too are mineral
estates, as a result. In Texas, a blanket release cured whatever
problems the severed mineral and surface estates might have
caused.
The mineral problems are complex, but pale in comparison
to the water problems. Remember that the 1833 Ortiz Mine
grant included the explicit grant of springs in the area for a
specific purpose and presumably a specific time. 1 2• That grant
of water lies at the core of Spanish and Mexican water rights
that are very much at the center of current litigation, while
mining rights continue to occupy an important, but sporadic,
place at its edges.
§ 1.03

Water Rights on Spanish and Mexican Land
Grants

[1] The Current Relevancy of Spanish and Mexican
Water Rights in the Southwest Today
In the 50 years immediately following the United States
acquisition of the Southwest in 1848, land grants and their
associated mineral rights rose together as the primary focus of
the federal common and statutory law of acquired property
rights under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. "Land, not
commerce; may have been the thing," as one astute American
businessman remarked on his arrival in the New Mexico of the
1880s, 1:ae but the land was at least as valuable for the minerals
it might contain as the surface area it might enclose. 1 27 In the
name of honoring rights to property acquired under the law of
its antecedent sovereigns, the United States stood Spanish and
12• See

note 49 supra and accompanying text.

1H V. Westphall, TM Public Domain in New Mexico, 1854-1891 1 (1965).
12'7 J . Peanon, The Ma.xweU Land Grant ( 1961) pueim. See alao note 117 supra.
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Mexican mining law on its head, creating a unified surface and
mineral estate where Spain and Mexico had kept them apart.
In that complex reversal, water as a related incident of land
grant title took a back seat. Population increase had not yet
made the water resource as scarce as it is today or as valuable
as hard rock minerals.
Thus, the surface title adjudications of the succeeding sovereign paid little attention to the water rights that might result
from the titles the sovereign con.firmed. Except for the awkward
rise of the "pueblo rights doctrine" in California, 1 2• not much
attention was paid to water. In its general land policy, Congress
disclaimed any interest in de.fining western water rights. 1 n In
their earliest legislation and decisions, western territories and
states were inclined to view water rights as riparian, that is,
as identical with and arising from title to land. uo As a result,
in the United States, in the elegant phraseology of Professor
Joseph McKnight, "the thread of Hispanic learning .. . seems
to have been lost." 1~1
That benign neglect has only changed in the last decade as
Spanish and Mexican water law has emerged as an area of
critical concern in the western United States. Population
growth has made 20th century water equivalent to the gold of
the 19th century.1:12 In order to deal with the increased pressure
on a more and more scarce resource, western states for the first
time have tried to create the uniform, comprehensive, correlative public systems of private claims to water that are necessary
to the functioning of any public system for the apportioning
of scarce suppliE~s. If recognized at all, Spanish and Mexican
1 :aa City of Loe Ancelet v. City of San Fernando, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1, 537 P.2d 1250,
1260-61 (1975).

1n California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 ( 1935).

uo Su, e.g., Motl v. Boyd, 116 Tex. 82, 286 S.W.2d 458 (1926); Lux v. Haggin, 69
Cal 255, 10 P. 674 (1886).
tat J. McKnight, "The Spanish Watercourses of Texut in M. Forkosch, ed., Essay
in Legal Hutory in Honor of Felu Frankfurter 374 (Bobbs-Merrill 1966).
1 u Comment, "A New Approach to Spanish and Mexican Land Grants." 33 U.C.L.A.
L Rev. 1364 nn. 2, 3 (1986).
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water rights must be included in those comprehensive decrees
to make modern water systems work.133
Hence, water rights created under Spain and Mexico and
inherited by the United States, are not the subject of old
lawsuits as the cases involving mineral rights are. Instead,
courts today must decide for the first time the nature and
extent of water rights created by the United States' antecedent
sovereigns. In turn, those lawsuits have spawned a new history
of old water rights.134
The new lawsuits have not all ended and the new history has
not always agreed, but the reqmt judicial and academic focus
on Spanish and Mexican water rights has allowed certain
principles to emerge. In the first place, everyone agrees that
no comprehensive code such as the 1783 Mining Ordinance
formally governed the acquisition of water in the American
Southwest. As the Supreme Court of California recently said,
the water law of the antecedent sovereigns "is essentially based
on inferences from historical circumstances rather than any
express provision of Spanish or Mexican law." us
However, that is not to say that water did not command the
attention of Spanish and Mexican authorities. Indeed, the
formal law of Spain and Mexico dealt extensively with access
to water. 13• In addition, legal commentators, who performed
133 Baade, "The Historical Background of Texas Water Law," 18 St. Mary's L. J.
1, 8-11 (1986). Baade's Texas analysis applies equally to California, Arizona, New
Mexico, and Colorado.
1 34 The relatively recent efforts to define judicially Pueblo Indian water rights has
produced no final decree but expert witnesses in the case have produced, among other
works, M. Meyer, Water in the Hispanic Southwest: A Social and Legal History (U.
Ariz. Press 1984); D. Tyler, The Mythical Pueblo Rights Doctrine: Water Administration
Hi.spanic New Mexico (1990) (hereafter The Mythical Pueblo Rights Doctrine ); Taylor,
"Land and Water Rights in the Viceroyalty of New Spain," 50 N. M. Hist. Rev. 189
(1975); and Baade, "The Historical Background of Texas Water Law," 18 St. Mary 's
L. J. 1 (1986). See al.,o New Mexico ex rel. Reynolds v. Aamodt, 618 F. Supp. 993
(D.N.M. 1985).
13S City of Loa Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 537 P .2d 1250, 1275, 123 Cal. Rptr.
1 (1975).
1 H M. Ebright, "New Mexican Land Grants: The Legal Background." in Briggs &
Van Neas, eds., Land, Water and Culture: New Perspectives on Hispanic Land Grants
15-26 (1987); Baade, supra note 134, at 33-75.
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a more elevated function in the civil law system than the
common law one, wrote extensively, if without agreement, on
the subject of water. 137 Finally, the Spanish and Mexican
archives of various southwestern states, particularly New Mexico, contain the actual records of pre-1848 water disputes and
their resolutions. 1:Ja
From these various sources, legal historians have arrived at
a consensus as to the broadest outlines of Spanish and Mexican
water law in the Southwest. They agree that water rights were
an independent part first of the royal property of the Spanish
Crown and then the public domain of the Mexican Nation. It
followed that water rights were not riparian as the old common
law used that term. In other words, the ownership of water did
not follow automatically from the ownership of the land on
which it ran. Instead, Spanish and Mexican water rights represented an estate separate from title to land and on a coordinate
independent status with minerals. As a result, the legal historians now agree, some conveyance from the sovereign owner,
whether the Crown under Spain or the Nation under Mexico,
was prerequisite to establishing a private right to water.13•
From those basic points of agreement, the legal historians
diverge, primarily on the problem of what Spanish and Mexican
law required in order to perfect a private right to water as
against initial sovereign ownership. One school hews to the view
that the law of the antecedent sovereigns required an explicit
grant, separate from land, in order to segregate water from
sovereign ownership and transfer it to private ownership. 140 In
137 See, e.g., J . Escriche y Martin, Dicionario Razonado de Legislacion y Jurisprudencia (1847 ed.); F. Galvan, Tratado de legislacion y Jurisprudencia sobre Aguas
(1849).
1 38 Ebright, "Manuel Martinez's Ditch Dispute: A Study in Mexican Period Custom
and Justice," 54 N. M. Hist. Rev. 21 (1979) (hereafter Manuel Martinez 's Ditch
Dupute ); J. Buter & M. Jenkins, "Settlement and Irrigation in the Santa CruzQuemado Watershed" (unpublished report, State Engineer Office, Santa Fe. May 1986);
Tyler, The Mythical Pueblo Rights Doctrine.
13• Baade, "The Historical Background of Texas Water Law," 18 St. Mary 's l . J .
33· 75 (1986), supra note 134; Meyer, Water in the Hispanic Southwest 115-31 (U. Ariz.
Presa 1984).
140 Baade, supra note 134 at 70-75.
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this view, Spanish and Mexican law permitted residents to use
sovereign water in common with all other residents and for
certain purposes including irrigation. That permit, however,
amounted only to a license, analogous to the implied right to
graze on the United States federal public domain and always
subject to continuous sovereign readjustment and even termination.141 A water grant was necessary to create a water right
and those were few and far between. 142
Other historians take an intermediate view of what Spanish
and Mexican law required in order to turn a claim to water into
a right to use it. While they agree that water began as separate
sovereign property and that, therefore, a private claim to it as
of right required a transfer from the sovereign, they are not
so hidebound on what that transfer had to consist of. In
addition to explicit water grants, some grants of land implied
the right to use water from available supplies and some did not.
Water rights were not riparian, but grants of land that designated a use that could not be accomplished without water
carried with them a right to use that necessary water. 1 .0 According to this view, these water grants by implication were
open-ended with respect to the actual quantity of water that
they could command and were also subject to continual governmental control. Nevertheless, they did represent a permanent
alienation of the sovereign domain and therefore amounted to
private rights in water. 144
Finally, the last school of legal historians holds that Spanish
and Mexican water rights did not require either an explicit or
implicit grant from governmental authority but arose from
customary use. In this view, water rights originating under the
Southwest's antecedent sovereigns find their source in the
141 /d. at 68-69 (analogizing the common use of waters to the implied license to graze
the early public domain recognized in Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 326 (1890)).
142 Another explicit grant of water involved the Arroyo Hondo grant in Taos County,
New Mexico. See Meyer, Water in the Hispanic Southwest 126 (1984).
1.0 Id. at 126-31. For example, land grants designated as "regadios" (irrigated land)
or "tierra de pan coger" (wheatland) required water to achieve their purpose whereas
"tierra de ganados" (grazing land) or "temporale" (land supplied by natural rainfall) did
not.
144 See Meyer, supra note 142, at 133-34.
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ancient laws of prescription, good even as against the sovereign. us These water rights by prescription resemble most
closely and most ironically water rights under the system of
prior appropriation which would become the law, at least in
part, in all the southwestern states, in that water rights by
prescription and by prior appropriation both arose by the
private application of sovereign water to beneficial use. 1.Around each of these contradictory theories of the source of
Spanish and Mexican water rights, there developed peripheral
issues about their nature and extent. Those who follow either
the explicit grant or the prescriptive view of the source of
Spanish and Mexican water rights regard those rights as fixed
in terms of both priority and quantity by virtue of either the
grant or the use. 147 Those who follow the looser implicit grant
theory see Spanish and Mexican water rights as not limited in
quantity and not apportioned by priority, but more closely
resembling a right to an equitable portion of a common
supply. 1 . .
There is equal disagreement about the sources of water to
which the basic Spanish and Mexican water law attached.
Springs and wells specifically and groundwater in general add
a layer of confusion. On this issue, the emerging debate focuses
on the extent to which the law of the antecedent sovereigns
treated this water differently from surface water. 14• A related
ambiguity involves whether Spanish and Mexican water law
ranked water rights by the type of use, making paramount the
domestic use of water and legally subordinating irrigation and
industrial uses to them. 1so
14S Manuel

Martinez'11 Ditch Dispute, supra note 138, at 21.

u• See, e.g., N.M. Const., art. XVI, § 4; Yeo v. Tweedy, 34 N.M. 611, 286 P . 970

(1929). .
147 Id.
1..a Meyer, supra note 142, at 144-64.
149 Compare Yeo v. Tweedy, 34 N.M. 6ll, 286 P. 970 (1929) with Meyer, "Living
Legacy of Hispanic Groundwater Law in the Contemporary Southweat,w 31 J. of tM
Southwe11t 287, 298 (1989).
150 See, e.g., J. McKnight, "The Spanish Watercourses of Texuw in M. Forkosch,
ed., E&11ay, in Legal History in Honor of Felix Franl'lfurter 386 (Bobbs-Merrill 1966);
Baade, "The Historical Background of Texas Water Law," 18 St. Mo.ry 's L. J . 1, 67,
82-83 (1986).
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All of these issues coalesce in the current debate about the
extent to which Spanish and Mexican law recognized a prior
and paramount right in certain settlements to the water that
was needed to maintain the community as it grew. If it existed
at all, 1111 the so-called "pueblo right" may have arisen by
operation of Spanish and Mexican law or it may have been
implied in the grant establishing a community, or finally, it may
have had to have been explicit in the community's grant. u2 In
any case, once established under the appropriate legal authority, the "pueblo right" involves historical questions about the
nature and extent of that right which parallel the similar issues
about Spanish and Mexican water rights in general., 53
Those emerging historical issues are only of academic interest in the pre-1848 context and are now practically important
only insofar as they have been incorporated into the law of the
succeeding sovereign. The property guarantees of the 1848
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo provide the obvious avenue for
this transfer of legal significance. However, serious issues
involving the interaction between the nature of "rights" to
water under Spanish and Mexican law and the nature of
"property" guaranteed by the Treaty make this a troublesome
issue. 154 It suffices to suggest here that if water use under Spain
and Mexico was, in the absence of a grant, by implied license,
then that license might not have risen to the level of a "property" right protected by the Treaty. ,as Similarly, if Spanish and
Mexican water rights arose by use and were based on prescription, then those rights may not have been protected either. ,se
Fortunately, these thorny treaty problems can be avoided by
looking to a second, easier source for protection of water
1St Baade, note 150 at 80-87 argues that the "pueblo right" never existed as a matter
of law. Tyler, The Mythical Puebw Rights Doctrine (1990), argues that it never existed
in New Mexico u a matter of fact.
1S2See notes 140-145 supra and accompanying text.
t 53 See, e.g., Stevens, "Pueblo Water Rights in New Mexico," 28 Nat. Resources J .
535 (1988).
1 M Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Feb. 2, 1848, art. 8, 9 Stat. 922, 929-30 ( 1851 ).
The article refers to "property of every kind."
1 • • See note 42 supra.
t H Grant v. Jaramillo, - N.M. 313. 28 P. 508 (1892).
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"rights" acquired under the law of the southwest's antecedent
sovereigns: local law. The various constitutions and statutes of
all states in the area acquired from Mexico recognize "prior
rights" to water, usually without further defining them. u7
Whatever ambiguity there is in the enforceability of strictly
treaty guarantees may be cured by the acknowledgment of
water rights in local law.
In contrast to rights to minerals, where federal courts and
national laws have predominated, local laws and state courts
have led the way in defining the nature and extent of Spanish
and Mexican water rights applicable today. As usual, the states
have taken radically different views on those rights.

(2) The California Experience with Spanish and
Mexican Water Rights
Early on, the California courts had to deal with the problem
of how to incorporate water rights brought into United States
sovereignty from Mexico along with the property rights that
federal and state law guaranteed. In 1886, Lux u. Haggin set
California on a course fundamentally different from that taken
in any other area covered by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.
In a case involving the rights of a downstream landowner
through whose property a stream ran against an upstream
appropriator of water, Judge McKinstry ruled that the ownership of land under Mexico carried with it by legal implication
the riparian right to the continuous flow of water passing
through the land. As part of that right, a downstream landowner could irrigate his land as could an upstream appropriator. But the upstream appropriator could not deprive the
downstream property owner whose title originated under Mexican law of. the reasonable flow of the river as it reached his
land.1sa
This Mexican right to continuous reasonable flow did not
originate in any expressed or implied grant of water. It was not
based on the application of water to beneficial use and, indeed,
1s7

N.M. Const., art. II. § 5; art. XVI. § 4.

1MLux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 10 P. 674 (1886).
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did not depend on the use of water flowing through the property
at all. Instead, it inhered to Mexican title to land. Based on
sources later discredited, n• the California riparian definition
of Mexican water rights inherent in Mexican land grants had
little authority in the law of the state's antecedent sovereigns
but nevertheless entered California water law to stay, albeit
awkwardly.1eo
The view expressed in Lux v. Haggin contributed as well to
another controversial version of Mexican water law, the socalled "pueblo right" by which Mexican communities acquired
a treaty-protected prior and paramount right under the law of
the antecedent sovereigns to all the water needed to sustain
the community. 1•1 In Lux v. Haggin, Judge McKinstey opened
the door to this version of Mexican water rights when he
opined:
By analogy, and in conformity with the principles of [Hart
v. Burnett] we hold the pueblos had a species of property in
the flowing waters within their limits,or "a certain right or
title" in their use, in trust, to be distributed to the common
lands [of the pueblo], and the lands originally set apart to
the settlers, or subsequently granted by the municipal
authorities. 1 .a
From this dicta, "the pueblo rights doctrine," consistent at
least with the California version of Mexican riparian water
rights, became part of California water law. Always criticized
as a fundamental distortion of Mexican water law, the "pueblo
rights doctrine" was last attacked in City of Los Angeles v. City
of San Fernando. ,a After 70 days of trial on the basis for the
, . . For reliance on Joaquin Escriche in Lw: 11. Haggin, see id. 10 P. at 707, 710,
715-17. For judicial criticism of Escriche, see State of Tes.u v. Valmont Plantations,
346 S.W.2d 853, 868 (Ct. App. Tes.. 1962), a/f'd sub nom. Valmont Plantations v. State
of Teua; 355 S.W.2d 502 (Tes.. 1962).
teo Baade, "The Historical Background of Tes.u Water Law: 18 St. Mary's L. J.
1, 14-15 (1986).
tet City of Loa Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 123 Cal. Rptr. l,
537 P.2d 1250, 1265 (1975), otters the trial court's buic definition of the non·Indian
pueblo right.
1ea Lw: 11. Haggin, 10 P. at 715.
1 a City of Lo, Angela 11. City of San Fern.and-0, 537 P.2d at 1261-62, 1273.
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"pueblo right" in Mexican law as of 1848, and another 17 days
devoted to the effect of California precedent on the issue, the
trial court refused to follow the long line of cases in previous
California law recognizing the "pueblo right" and ruled that the
City of Los Angeles enjoyed no such right. 1 M Holding that the
prior holdings of the California courts were not "palpably
erroneous or unreasonable," the state supreme court reversed
and upheld the "pueblo right" of the City of Los Angeles.,..
For the moment, that aspect of Mexican water rights in present-day California has been laid to rest.
However, other relatively recent developments in California
water law may place those long-recognized rights in a new
perspective. In National Audubon Society u. Superior Court, the
California Supreme Court applied the public trust doctrine to
circumscribe and limit the City of Los Angeles' appropriative
rights acquired under state law in non-navigable tributaries to
Mono Lake.1M In a nearly simultaneous decision, the United
States Supreme Court held that the State of California could
not assert its public trust easement against tidelands the
private title to which had been perfected under Mexico and
confirmed by the United States under the 1851 California
Lands Act. H 7 Because Audubon involved state appropriative
water rights and Summa Corp. involved confirmed Mexican
rights, the two decisions do not conflict. But if Audubon had
involved the kind of Mexican "riparian" water rights recognized
in California since Lux u. Haggin, then California might have
been barred as it was in Summa Corp. from now asserting a
public trust interest in those rights.1 ..
As recognized in California, water rights that originated
under Mexican sovereignty continue today as categorically
/d. at 1265, n. 17 at 1274.
at 1275.
tM 33 Cal. 3d 419, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 658 P.2d 709, cert. denied sub nom. Los Angeles
Oep't of Water & Power v. National Audubon Soc'y, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
HT Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. State Landa Comm'n, 466 U.S. 198 (1984).
For the 1851 statute, see notes 72 and 73 supra and accompanying text.
tM Comment, "A New Approach to Spanish and Mexican Land Grants," 33 U. C.L.A.
L. Reu. 1364 (1986).
1M

1H /d.
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different from either appropriative or riparian rights originating since 1848. Those Mexican water rights arise from Mexican
land rights. Their nature and extent is different from other
rights recognized in California. Now, in what may turn out to
be the most important difference of all, those Mexican water
rights may be insulated from the broadening overlay of public
trust controls.

[3] The New Mexico Experience with Spanish and
Mexican Water Rights
Of all the southwestern states, New Mexico had the most
fully developed, deeply entrenched hydraulic society at the
change of sovereignties in 1848. 1 • • Legally and politically, New
Mexico officials had to recognize the validity of water rights
acquired prior to the change in sovereignty. They did so with
their very first legislative enactments.no However, the need to
define the rights that the new New Mexico had recognized arose
more slowly.
Beginning in 1898, the New Mexico courts suggested t hat
Mexico had followed the doctrine of prior appropriation before
1848. n 1 Thereafter, every few years, the courts repeated the
finding about the nature and extent of water rights inherited
from New Mexico's antecedent sovereigns until by 1938 the
New Mexico courts had announced that New Mexico's first
sedentary settlers, the Pueblo Indians, had followed the doctrine of prior appropriation and that it applied both to surface
and groundwater. n2
In holding that New Mexico's earliest irrigators had acquired
water rights under the doctrine of prior appropriation, the New
Mexico . courts ruled that the water law of the antecedent
sovereigns was not riparian, thus contradicting the California
decisions. 1 n Instead, New Mexico saw Spanish and Mexican
1n

See notes 8, 9 above.
Stat. Ann. Pamphlet 3, Historical Documents, § 1, at 71 (1978).
171 United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irr. Co., 10 N.M. 617, 61 P. 111 (1900).
172See, e.g., Hagerman Irr. Co. v. McMurry, 16 N.M. 172, 113 P. 823 (1911); Yeo
v. Tweedy, 34 N.M. 611, 286 P. 970 (1929 ).
173 /d.
170 N.M.
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water law as conferring rights based on and limited to use and
apportioned by priority between users competing for scarce
common supplies.174 In New Mexico's view, there was no need
for either an expressed or implied grant of water under Spanish
and Mexican law, 179 because it was the application of water to
beneficial use which gave rise to the right.
This apparently small piece of historical alchemy yielded
large benefits to New Mexico courts, busy since the mid-1960s
in massive adjudication suits. These suits are aimed at bringing
all New Mexico claims to water within the same decrees so that
the administration of all claims to water relative to each other,
the sine qua non of an administered prior appropriation system,
can proceed. 17• Since all water rights in New Mexico, both
those originating prior to 1848, those originating between 1848
and 1907, when New Mexico instituted its state licensing
system, and those originating since 1907 with licenses defining
their elements 1n were identical, it was easier to assemble them
than in either Texas or California where comprehensive water
decrees involved homogenizing prior appropriative and riparian
rights recognized at different times in both states. 1 , . At this
writing, New Mexico state and federal courts have entered
thousands of orders assigning pre-1848 priorities to individual
water rights owners and adjudicating to those owners a specified quantity of water from a common source. 17• Now the
decrees have swallowed the history.
The imposition of the patina of the "Colorado doctrine"
version of prior appropriation over the long course of New
Mexico water use has tinted as well New Mexico's own struggle
with the "pueblo rights" doctrine. Unsure from the start about
whether to adopt the California version of Mexican municipal
N.M. Const., art. XVI, § 4.
note 146 supra and accompanying text.
179 State of New Mexico v. Pecos Valley Artesian Conservancy Dist., 99 N.M. 699,
663 P.2d 358 (1983).
177 N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-5-1 (1978).
1 7• See notes 158-162 supra and accompanying text and notes 188-189 infra and
accompanying text. See also Baade, supra at note 134 at 11-21.
179 See, e.g., "Taos Adjudication Pamphlet" (1986); "Taos Adjudication Pamphlet"
(1987) (State Engineer Office, Santa Fe, N.M.).
174 See

179 See
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water rights, 1•0 the New Mexico Supreme Court finally had to
face the issue in a suit for private damages against the successor
to an 1835 municipality which defended against the claim that
it had misappropriated water by affirmatively asserting that it
had a prior and paramount right to all the water just like the
City of Los Angeles. A badly divided supreme court agreed and
the "pueblo rights" became part of New Mexico law.1•1

Cartwright turned on whether the "pueblo rights" doctrine
was consistent with the underlying law of prior appropriation
that New Mexico said had always governed the area. The
majority argued that the "pueblo right" merely carried the
"torch of priority" into Mexican municipal water law. 182 The
dissent complained that the reservation of water for unspecified
future use violated the basic principle of prior appropiation law
requiring actual application to beneficial use as prerequisite to
establishing the right to a fixed quantity of water. 1u No one
questioned whether the doctrine of prior appropriation itself
properly informed the debate.
Since 1959, the New Mexico Supreme Court has been reluctant to extend the "pueblo rights" doctrine to cities other than
Las Vegas. 1M Historians looking at the actual water administration practices of pre-1848 New Mexico find nothing resembling the "pueblo rights" doctrine there. 1 H Now the specific
issue of the validity of the City of Las Vegas' "pueblo right"
is pending for the first time in a general stream adjudication. 1 "
The New Mexico Court of Appeals has refused to give the
Cartwright decision res judicata effect. If the ruling is upheld,
the evidentiary hearing that will follow may repeat the 87-day
1 ao State ex reL Community Ditches v. Tularosa Community Ditch, 19 N.M. 352,
378, 143 P. 207 (1914); New Mexico Products v. New Mexico Power Co., 42 N.M. 311,
77 P.2d 634 (1937).
1a1 See Cartwright v. Public Service Co. of N.M., 66 N.M. 64, 343 P .2d 654 (1958).

182 66

183

N.M. at 85.

ld. at 87.

1 84 City

of Albuquerque v. Reynolds, 71 N.M. 428, 379 P .2d 73 (1962).

1H

0. Tyler, The Mythical Pueblo Rights Doctrine.
1M State ex reL Reynolds v. Lewis, Chaves County Nos. 20294 and 22600 Consolidated, Subfile Nos. UP 8.39-8.45, slip op. N.M. Ct. of App., June 10, 1990.
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nightmare involved in the 1975 case, City of Los Angeles v. City
of San Fernando., ... ,

[4) The Texas Experience with Spanish and
Mexican Water Rights
In the 20th century, Texas started down the California road
toward recognizing water rights it had inherited from Mexico,
and then in the last decade turned abruptly aside. In Motl v.
Boyd, 187 the Texas Supreme Court held that the Mexican
irrigation system, prevailing in Texas under its antecedent
sovereigns and continued for a short time after the transfer of
sovereignty, had been riparian in nature. In other words, in
Mexican Texas as in Mexican California under Lux v. Haggin,
riparian owners could divert surface waters running through
their lands and irrigate their lands with those waters, but the
right to do so came from their ownership of the bordering lands,
not some independent water right, and was limited not by the
beneficial use limitation at the heart of the doctrine of prior
appropriation, but by the reasonable use requirement of the
riparian doctrine. In so deciding, Texas aligned itself with
California and against New Mexico with respect to the fundamental attributes of the Mexican water rights each recognized.
Then, beginning in 1962, the Texas courts changed direction.
First, in Valmont Plantations, the Texas Supreme Court reversed 1.\fotl and now rejected the riparian basis of that case
for perennial surface waters., .. The contest in Valmont involved rights to Rio Grande water on the river's north bank
in Texas and was between riparians who claimed under Mexican period surface grants and appropriators under Texas legislation enacted after 1888. If the Motl view was correct, then
the riparians holding under Mexican grants had riparian rights
senior to the subsequent non-riparian appropriators. The Valmont court rejected the Motl view and awarded the riparian
, ... , City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 123 Cal. Rptr. l, 537 P.2d 1250,
1274 n. 17 (1975).
187116 Tex. 82, 104, 107-08, 268 S.W. 458, 465, 467 (1926); Baade, supra note 134
at 18·19.
tN State v. Valmont Plantations, 163 Tex. 381, 355 S.W.2d 5-02 (1962).
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owners only secondary "equitable" water rights under Texas
law. 1 " The Valmont court held that a right of irrigation was
not an appurtenance to Mexican surface grants along the Rio
Grande.
From that reversal, the remaining debates about the nature
and extent of water rights acquired under Mexico and carried
into Texas sovereignty lined up like ducks on a pond. In a series
of contemporaneous opinions in the mid 1980s brought on by
a state of Texas adjudication of water rights, the Texas courts
brought Mexican water rights into line with the views expressed
in Valmont Plantations and extended and elaborated its basic
holding.
First, the courts ruled that Valmont applied to perennial
waters throughout Mexican Texas.190 Then the Texas Supreme
Court amplified its ruling when, in the Medina River adjudication, it held that a riparian owner along a non-perennial stream
had no irrigation right under Mexican law in the absence of
an express grant from the antecedent sovereign. 1• 1 In one fell
swoop, Texas had extended its rule to all surface waters,
confirmed its rejection of the California version of Mexican
riparian rights, rejected New Mexico's version of Mexican
rights arising by application of water to beneficial use, rejected
the alternative theory that some rights to water arose by
implication from the type of land grant, and adopted the view
that only an expressed grant of water conveyed water rights
would survive the change in sovereignties.

In that context, it was a much smaller step to Texas rejection
of the "pueblo rights" doctrine that so worried California and
New Mexico. Given its first opportunity, the Texas Supreme
Court ruled that the successor to a Mexican Pueblo in Texas
did not enjoy a prior and paramount right to the waters flowing
1 • 355 S.W.2d at 506. See Baade. supra note 134 at 24 and notes 138-142. See also
McKnight, "The Spanish Watercourses of Texas," in M. Forkosch, Essays in Legal
Hi.story in Honor of Felix Frankfurter 384 (Bobbs-Merrill 1966).
190 In re Adjudication of the Water Rights of the Cibolo Creek Watershed of the
San Antonio River Basin, 568 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
191 In re Adjudication of the Water Rights in the Medina River Watershed of the
San Antonio River Basin, 670 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984).
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through it by virtue of the town's establishment and by operation of Mexican law. 192 Suggesting that the California doctrine
as accepted by New Mexico had no basis in the historical law
of Spain or Mexico, the court refused to recognize that a
Mexican municipality had any special rights to water at all. 1u
Thus on the specific issue of "pueblo rights," the Texas
decision leaves those southwestern states brought into United
States sovereignty by the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
in complete disarray. California recognizes "pueblo rights."
Texas rejects them. And poor New Mexico, so close to both
neighbors, is reconsidering.
But the difference of opinion on the specific "pueblo rights"
issue is paralleled by an equally profound difference about the
nature and extent of water rights in general inherited from
Mexican sovereignty and applied in the Southwest today. One
legal history has given rise to three very different bodies oflaw.
California says Mexican water rights inherited by it are riparian; New Mexico and Texas disagree. New Mexico says that
the extensive Mexican water rights inherited by it are nonriparian and appropriative; California and Texas disagree. And
Texas alone says Mexican water rights inherited by it come
from neither land ownership nor water use but from an express
grant from the antecedent sovereign.
Large issues remain to be forced through the different perspectives that these mutually exclusive interpretations provide.
The most critical emerging one seems to involve the application
of Mexican water law to groundwater. Some suggest that
Spanish.and Mexican law conferred the absolute right to it on
the owner of the overlying estate.11M Others are more cautious.
Obviously those who favor the riparian view of Mexican water
rights will feel more comfortable with the idea that groundwa192 [n re Contest of Laredo to the Adjudication of Water Rights in the Middle Rio
Grande Buin & Contributing Texas Tributaries, 675 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. App. 1984).
193 Id. at 267-70.
1M Meyer, "Living Legacy of Hispanic Groundwater Law in the Contemporary
Southwestt 31 J. of the Southwest 287 (1989).
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ter belonged to the surface owner as well. But these are issues
that remain to be worked out by the courts. 1 . .
§ 1.04

A Short Conclusion to a Long and Tangled

Tale
What hard rock minerals were to the 19th century Southwest
for the first time under United States rule, water is and will
be to the area's 20th and 21st centuries. The law of the region's
natural resources is as complex as its history is long. Federal
and state law have always obligated succeeding sovereigns to
respect the property rights acquired under the law of the
antecedent sovereigns. In the case of minerals, the United
States, in confirming those acquired rights, rearranged the
basic structure of estates in Spanish and Mexican real property.
Confirmation reunited the surface and mineral estates Spain
and Mexico so assiduously had kept apart. However, only the
United States as state successor to reserved minerals lost. In
the case of water and land under Spanish and Mexican law,
the stakes are much higher, the historical issues much more
clouded, and the current state of the law much more unsettled.
195 See, e.g., Concerning the Application for Water Rights of: American Water
Development. Inc., the Baca Ranch Co.. and the Baca Corporation in Saguache County,
No. 86-CW-46, Dist. C. Water Div. 3, Colorado.

